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Gerald L. Neuman* 
A multi-faceted controversy is currently raging over the con-
stitutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 
(RFRA),t the federal legislative response to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith.z In Smith, the 
Supreme Court eliminated most constitutional claims to religious 
exemption from generally applicable laws, abandoning a prior 
practice of subjecting such claims (verbally at least) to a compel-
ling interest test. The majority asserted that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not require state or federal governments to accom-
modate conscientious objectors to compliance with generally ap-
plicable laws. Congress, in turn, emphasized that "laws 'neutral' 
toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws 
intended to interfere with religious exercise," and acted to "re-
store the compelling interest test" as a matter of statutory right.3 
Congress's authority to enact such a statute, particularly as 
applied to generally applicable laws of the states, has been dis-
puted. The legislative history of RFRA indicates congressional 
belief that its interference with state laws could be justified as an 
exercise of enforcement authority under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Several commentators have questioned this 
justification, arguing that Congress's reinstatement of a vision of 
religious liberty that the Supreme Court had just rejected 
stretches Section 5 authority beyond tolerable limits. The ques-
tion of the source of congressional authority has acquired further 
salience as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United 
States v. Lopez,4 reasserting the doctrine of enumerated powers 
as a guide to the interpretation of the Commerce Clause and in-
validating a purported congressional exercise of commerce 
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful to Lori Fisler Damrosch, 
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1. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb et 
seq.). 
2. 494 u.s. 872 (1990). 
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(2), 2000bb(b)(1). 
4. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995). 
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power for the first time since the New Deal. The Court has ac-
cepted a case raising such a challenge to RFRA in its current 
term.s 
Thus far, analysts have generally assumed that Section 5 pro-
vides the only possible basis for a broad federal intervention to 
protect religious dissenters across a wide range of state govern-
mental activities. Fanciful defenses under the Commerce Clause 
might have been framed before Lopez, but they would clearly 
fail today. 
Characteristically, constitutional commentators have ne-
glected the global dimension of religious liberty. Religious free-
dom is a matter of international concern, and the United States 
has recently adhered to a major human rights treaty that ad-
dresses the question of religious exemptions. Consequently, an 
overlooked source of authority for RFRA, or for a RFRA-like 
statute, lies in Congress's power to implement the treaty obliga-
tions of the United States. The main purpose of this essay is to 
call attention to this perspective on the RFRA debate. If it also 
helps sensitize constitutional lawyers to the United States' inter-
national human rights obligations, then that is all to the good. 
I. RFRA AND ITS PROBLEMS 
As readers probably recall, the majority opinion in Smith of-
fered a surprising reanalysis of the Supreme Court's Free Exer-
cise Clause cases. Alfred Smith had been denied unemployment 
compensation after having been fired from his job due to his use 
of peyote as a matter of ritual within the Native American 
Church, in violation of Oregon law.6 The majority held that his 
violation of a generally applicable criminal statute provided an 
adequate basis for denying him unemployment compensation, 
and that his religious beliefs did not entitle him to any exemption 
from the statute. Religiously motivated actions are constitution-
ally shielded against laws that "ban [them] only when they are 
engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious 
belief that they display,"? but not against generally applicable 
prohibitions. The majority declined to examine whether the de-
nial of a religious exemption was necessary to the achievement of 
5. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (granting certiorari); see also 65 
U.S.L.W. 3282 (Oct. 15, 1996) (listing questions presented). 
6. 494 U.S. at 874. 
7. Id. at 877; see Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 
2217 (1993) (invalidating ordinance that prohibited animal sacrifice, while permitting kill-
ing of animals for other reasons). 
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a compelling government interest, the standard articulated in nu-
merous cases since Sherbert v. Verners in 1963. The Court re-
duced the Sherbert doctrine to a narrow line of cases in which a 
government benefits program includes a system of individualized 
exemptions but does not extend it to a "religious hardship."9 It 
distinguished cases like Wisconsin v. Yoderw as presenting a "hy-
brid situation" implicating both the free exercise of religion and 
another constitutional right.n Having disposed of these hold-
ings, the majority dismissed other applications of the compelling 
interest test as dicta, and maintained that a society as diverse as 
the United States would be inviting anarchy if it made govern-
ment demonstrate to the courts the necessity for denying claims 
to religious exemption.I2 
The Court's rough handling of precedent and its withdrawal 
of a guarantee of accommodation to religious dissenters 
prompted an extraordinary political reaction.13 Religious groups 
mobilized bipartisan support in Congress for a statutory "restora-
tion" of the status quo as they perceived it to have existed before 
Smith. RFRA prohibits both state and federal governments from 
"substantially burden[ing]" a person's exercise of religion, unless 
the imposition of that burden is the least restrictive means of fur-
thering a compelling governmental interest.I4 It provides for ju-
dicial relief against prohibited burdens, and places the burden of 
proof on government in the application of the compelling inter-
est test. 
For evident technical reasons, RFRA operates differently in 
the sphere of federal burdens and state burdens. RFRA creates 
a statutory right to religious exemption from the implementation 
of federal statutes, and creates statutory exemptions from prior 
federal statutes, but it cannot successfully bar subsequent federal 
statutes from imposing unnecessary burdens. Instead, it adopts a 
rule of construction by which subsequent statutes must explicitly 
reference RFRA in order to exclude its application.ls In the 
sphere of state law, in contrast, federal supremacy permits 
8. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
9. 494 U.S. at 884. 
10. 406 u.s. 205 (1972). 
11. 494 U.S. at 881-82. 
12. !d. at 883-85, 888-89. 
13. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide 
to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 39 Viii. L. Rev. 1, 12-17 (1994); Douglas Lay-
cock and Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tex. L. 
Rev. 209 (1994). 
14. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-l. 
15. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb-3(b). 
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RFRA (if valid) to create an entitlement to exemptions from all 
state laws, current or future. 
RFRA has been hailed as a historic vindication of the 
United States' commitment to religious liberty, and condemned 
as a dangerous interference with judicial authority and states' 
rights. To some of RFRA's detractors, the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Smith expressed the correct understanding of religious 
liberty, and RFRA affords religious objectors an unjustifiable 
privilege.16 Such criticism applies potentially to the use of 
RFRA to create religious exemptions in the federal sphere as 
well as in the state sphere. At the extreme, RFRA might run 
into Establishment Clause problems by overstepping the bounds 
of Congress's discretion to accommodate religious needs;11 in 
less extreme instances, RFRA might be deemed an imprudent 
use of Congress's lawful power to accommodate. The severity of 
the problem may depend on how the courts interpret RFRA's 
"compelling interest" test.Is 
Another broad criticism of RFRA relies on the Smith major-
ity's institutional critique of the use of the courts to balance the 
claims of religious conscience and compliance with public policy. 
Arguably legislatures are better suited than courts to identifying 
the occasions on which general policies may be safely or conve-
16. See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager. Why the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional. 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 437, 448-50 (1994). 
17. It could be argued that RFRA as a whole is more than the sum of its individual 
applications and violates the Establishment Clause on its face, see id. at 457-58, or that 
the extension of particular exemptions under RFRA would exceed Establishment Clause 
limits. Compare Estate of Thornton 11. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985) (invalidating 
absolute preference for Sabbath observers as Establishment Clause violation), with Cor-
poration of Presiding Bishop 11. Amos. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding Title VII exemp-
tion against Establishment Clause challenge). In cases of the latter kind, an actual finding 
of unconstitutionality could probably be avoided by recognizing government's interest in 
avoiding Establishment Clause violations as a compelling reason to withhold the exemp-
tion under RFRA itself. In enacting RFRA, Congress disclaimed any attempt to tamper 
with Establishment Clause doctrine. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4. 
18. The applicable test is clouded somewhat by statutory references in the congres-
sional findings and declaration of purposes. One of the "findings" maintains that "the 
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for 
striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental 
interests," while one of the stated purposes is "to restore the compelling interest test as 
set forth in Sherbert 11. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin 11. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972)," id. §§ 2000bb(a)(5), 2000bb(b)(1) (emphasis added). Most observers believe that 
some cases decided between Yoder and Smith purported to apply the compelling interest 
test but did so less stringently than Sherbert and Yoder. These precedents may also have 
been "restored" by RFRA. See Berg, 39 Viii. L. Rev. 31-50 (cited in note 13); Laycock 
and Thomas, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 222-27 (cited in note 13); Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the 
RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171 
(1995); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A RFRA Runs Through It: Religious Freedom and the 
U.S. Code, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 249 (1995). 
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niently waived for the accommodation of religious objectors. 
Some think that Smith's disclaimer of institutional competence 
renders RFRA a violation of separation of powers, even as ap-
plied to federal burdens.19 
The most intriguing critique of RFRA, however, concerns 
Congress's power to create religious exemptions to state legisla-
tion. One may concede that the power to enact federal laws in-
cludes the power to mitigate the burdens those laws place on 
exercise of religion, and also that many instances of state regula-
tion lie in the overlap between state and federal competence 
where Congress has the authority to modify state policies.zo But 
the comprehensive character of RFRA suggests that a justifica-
tion stitched together out of specific congressional powers over 
specific subject matters independent of religion may fail to cover 
all of RFRA's consequences. This appears particularly likely af-
ter the Supreme Court's emphasis in Lopez on preserving the 
local criminal law as a traditional field of state legislative power. 
Accordingly, critics and defenders alike have understood that 
RFRA must rest on some federal power to protect the exercise 
of religion itself. In accordance with RFRA's legislative history, 
they have focused on Congress's enforcement power under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as the available candidate. 
Critics maintain that RFRA's approach to religious liberty is fa-
tally inconsistent with the Supreme Court's authoritative exposi-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause in Smith; defenders offer 
broader and narrower accounts of how Smith and RFRA can be 
reconciled. 
RFRA thus revives the fundamental controversy over the 
meaning of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, ignited by the majority and dissenting opinions in Katzen-
bach v. Morgan.zt Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan 
offered two alternative means by which Congress could justify 
outlawing a state governmental practice that the Court had up-
held under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under what has come 
to be known as the "remedial" alternative, Congress might prop-
19. See In re Tessier. 190 B.R. 396 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1995); Joanne C. Brant, Taking 
the Supreme Court at its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 
Mont. L. Rev. 5 (1995); see also Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Comm'n, 913 
P.2d 909, 931-39 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring) (finding that RFRA violates separa-
tion of powers even as to state court), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3034 (Jul. 8, 
1996) (No. 96-31). Contra, Rores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1363 (5th Cir. 1996), 
cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (No. 95-2074). 
20. Cf. Title VII, as amended in 1972, which prohibits state employment discrimina-
tion on grounds of religion. 
21. 384 u.s. 641 (1966). 
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erly find that a federal prohibition, not itself required by the 
amendment, was an appropriate means of preventing future vio-
lations of the amendment.zz Under the "substantive" alternative, 
Congress might legitimately find, as a matter of fact or as a mat-
ter of law, that a practice that the Court had upheld actually vio-
lated the amendment.z3 The latter alternative has been highly 
controversial, due to its apparent tension with the independent 
judicial duty to interpret the Constitution, articulated since Mar-
bury v. Madison, and no case since Morgan has relied upon it. 
Supporters of RFRA have more commonly offered a "reme-
dial" justification for the statute, contending that the statutory 
right to religious exemption is a prophylactic measure, designed 
to prevent violations of religious freedom that even the Supreme 
Court would recognize as unconstitutional after Smith. For ex-
ample, Douglas Laycock has argued that the difficulty of litigat-
ing governmental motive has enabled generally applicable laws 
that were in fact designed to restrict religious practice to escape 
the judicial condemnation that they deserve.z4 Moreover, reli-
gions vary in the number and influence of their adherents, and 
the selective responsiveness of legislatures to requests for exemp-
tions may amount to a form of discrimination.zs Justice Scalia 
viewed this prospect with equanimity in Smith, but a subsequent 
majority gave it greater emphasis in the Kiryas Joel case (from 
which he dissented).z6 
Evaluating this "remedial" justification is made difficult by 
the sparse Section 5 case law and by uncertainties about the in-
terpretation of RFRA. If RFRA is designed to prevent the use 
of generally applicable laws to discriminate against particular re-
ligions, then how often does such discrimination really occur, in 
proportion to the number of exemptions that RFRA will gener-
ate? This question turns on empirical data-as to which Con-
22. ld. at 652-53. 
23. !d. at 654-56. 
24. E.g., Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 1993 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 221 (1993); see H.R. Rep. 103-88, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1993) ("[L]egislative mo-
tive often cannot be determined and courts have been reluctant to impute bad motives to 
legislators."). 
25. Berg, 39 Viii. L. Rev. at 21-22 (cited in note 13); seeS. Rep. 103-111, 103d Cong., 
1st Sess. 8 (1993) ("State and local legislative bodies cannot be relied upon to craft excep-
tions from Jaws of general application to protect the ability of the religious minorities to 
practice their faiths"). 
26. Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist v. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. 2481, 
2491-93 (1994). 
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gress made no quantitative findingsz7-and on the stringency of 
the RFRA standard as the courts will define and apply it. Critics 
have maintained that the likelihood that intentional discrimina-
tion motivated a given generally applicable law is too remote to 
support RFRA's sweeping grant of religious exemptions for all 
denominations.zs One may compare the Supreme Court's re-
fusal in Oregon v. Mitchell to accept voting rights for 18-to-20-
year olds as a means of preventing discrimination against that 
age cohort.z9 Assuming, however, that matters of degree are for 
legislative rather than judicial determination, so long as the regu-
lation employs a reasonable means to a legitimate end, RFRA 
might be justified anecdotally without quantitative inquiry.3o If 
instead RFRA is designed to ensure equal responsiveness to mi-
nority religions, then one might question whether a noncompara-
tive compelling interest test is suited to that function.3I 
At the same time, RFRA supporters have also offered a 
"substantive" justification. As Laycock has expressed it, RFRA 
"is designed to restore the rights that previously existed under 
the Free Exercise Clause, rights that Congress believes should 
exist if the Constitution were properly interpreted. "32 The find-
ings provision of RFRA itself could be construed as stating that, 
under a proper interpretation of the First Amendment, free exer-
27. See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: The Constitu-
tional Significance of an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 39,62 & n.l25 (1995); 
Lupu, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 216-17 (cited in note 18). 
28. Conkle, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 61-62 (cited in note 27); Lupu, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 
216-17 (cited in note 18); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of 
"Tests" Under the Religion Clauses, 1995 S. Ct. Rev. 323, 342-44; see also Sasnett v. Sulli-
van, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.) (finding it "not easy to take entirely 
seriously the proposition that the enactment of RFRA was necessary in order to prevent 
the states from engaging in forms of intentional discrimination that ... could not readily 
be shown to be intentional"), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (Oct. 29, 1996) 
(No. 96-710). 
29. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Moreover, some critics see merit in the claim once made by 
Justice Rehnquist that Congress's Section 5 powers with respect to substantive provisions 
of the Bill of Rights incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment should be judged by different standards than Congress's Section 5 powers with re-
spect to the Equal Protection Clause. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 717-18 (1978) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Conkle, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 68-69 (cited in note 27); MarciA. 
Hamilton. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the Henhouse 
Under Cover of Section 5 of the Founeenth Amendment, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 357, 391-96 
(1994); Lupu, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 217 (cited in note 18). 
30. See City of Rome v. United States. 446 U.S. 156 (1980); McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Douglas Laycock, RFRA, Congress, and the Ratchet. 56 
Mont. L. Rev. 145. 166-67 (1995). 
31. See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability of Con-
science: The Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
1245, 1289-90 (1994) (arguing that it is not). 
32. Laycock and Thomas, 73 Tex. L. Rev. at 219 (cited in note 13). 
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cise rights would be as strongly protected against the incidental 
burdens resulting from "neutral" laws as against deliberately im-
posed burdens.33 It is this interpretation of RFRA that raises the 
most fundamental questions, and that has excited the most vehe-
ment criticism.34 On this interpretation, Congress has substituted 
its own broader understanding of the meaning of the Free Exer-
cise Clause for the Supreme Court's understanding.3s Congress 
has not even invoked the weaker (but still controversial) account 
of Section 5 power that would entitle it to apply its superior fact 
finding capacity to evaluate the constitutionality of state action 
under court-given standards.36 Congress has rejected the court-
given standards. Accepting this expansive view of Section 5 
power would transform current conceptions of the roles of the 
branches in constitutional interpretation. Morgan does contain 
the seeds of such a transformation, but the Supreme Court has 
not encouraged their growth in the intervening years. 
Judges have begun to examine the constitutionality of 
RFRA as applied to state-imposed burdens on the exercise of 
religion, and have reached different conclusions. Some district 
courts have upheld RFRA on either "remedial" or "substantive" 
rationales.37 Two district court decisions have held RFRA un-
constitutional,3s although one was then reversed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which approved RFRA as an exercise of Congress's 
"remedial" authority.39 The Fifth Circuit panel accepted the ar-
guments (1) that RFRA compensates for the difficulty of proving 
motive, and serves as a prophylactic measure to prevent inten-
tional discrimination against a particular religion or religion in 
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a). 
34. See Conkle, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 39 (cited in note 27); Eisgruber and Sager, 61 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1245 (cited in note 31); Hamilton, 16 Cardozo L. Rev. 357 (cited in note 29); 
Lupu, 56 Mont. L. Rev. 171 (cited in note 18). 
35. Because Congress's conception of free exercise rights is broader, not narrower, 
than the Court's, and because Congress has not attempted to tamper with Establishment 
Clause doctrine, RFRA is consistent with the "ratchet theory," that Section 5 empowers 
Congress to expand but not to contract constitutional rights. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 
384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). 
36. Lupu, 56 Mont. L. Rev. at 216-17 (cited in note 18); see Archibald Cox, The Role 
of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 199 (1971). 
37. See Sasnett v. Dep't of Corrections, 891 F. Supp. 1305 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (reme-
dial), affd sub nom Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996), petition for cert. filed, 
65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (Oct. 29, 1996) (No. 96-710); Belgard v. Hawaii, 883 F. Supp. 510 (D. 
Haw. 1995) (substantive); Abordo v. Hawaii, 902 F. Supp. 1220 (D. Haw. 1995) 
(ambiguous). . 
38. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 928 F. Supp. 591 (D. Md. 1996); Rores v. City of 
Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. 
granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (No. 95-2074). 
39. Rores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 
293 (1996) (No. 95-2074). 
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general, and (2) that RFRA compensates for the unequal polit-
ical power of minority religions, thus serving both free exercise 
and equal protection values.40 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit 
questioned the factual basis for the intent rationale, but viewed 
Congress's remedial authority as broad enough to support the 
more plausible rationale of unequal responsiveness.41 An Eighth 
Circuit judge, in contrast, has interpreted RFRA as necessarily 
relying on a "substantive" rationale, substituting its view of the 
meaning of the Free Exercise Clause for the Supreme Court's 
view, and as therefore unconstitutional.42 The Supreme Court 
has already granted certiorari to review the Fifth Circuit decision, 
and so may address the question in the current term.43 
II. RELIGION AND THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 
In the midst of the movement toward the passage of RFRA, 
but apparently without attracting much attention from its propo-
nents, the United States acceded to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR). The CCPR is one of the 
major multilateral human rights treaties, part of the International 
Bill of Rights, designed to give more concrete and binding form 
to the vision expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights of 1948.44 It has more than one hundred states-parties, 
which have undertaken to respect and to ensure to individuals a 
series of civil and political rights including life, liberty, physical 
integrity, privacy, equality before the law, and freedoms of 
thought, conscience, expression and association. 
The obligations of states-parties to the CCPR are not merely 
negative. Under CCPR Article 2, each agrees "to take the neces-
sary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes ... to 
adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to 
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant."4s 
40. Id. at 1359-60. 
41. Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.), petition 
for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (Oct. 29, 1996) (No. %-710). 
42. Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545, 1566-68 (8th Cir. 1996) (McMillian, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 193 (19%); see also Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1306 
(9th Cir. 1996) (Fernandez. J., concurring) (expressing "serious doubts about the constitu-
tionality of Congress's attempt to overrule Smith and to reinstate (or instate) a flawed 
view of the scope and proper construction of the religion clauses"). In both cases, the 
panel majority did not reach the constitutional issue, finding instead that the plaintiffs' 
RFRA claims failed on the merits. 
43. City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996) (granting certiorari). 
44. See Louis Henkin, Introduction, in Louis Henkin, ed., The International Bill of 
Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1 (1981). 
45. CCPR Article 2(2). 
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Formal enactment of the rights does not suffice if further meas-
ures, tailored to existing social conditions and the features of the 
legal system, are needed for their realization.46 This may require 
laws shielding rights against certain forms of interference from 
private parties as well as from the government itself.47 In addi-
tion, Article 2 requires the assurance of "an effective remedy" 
for the violation of covered rights, to be determined by a "com-
petent authority," and indeed encourages states-parties "to de-
velop the possibilities of judicial remedy."4s Forms of 
international oversight of compliance with the CCPR exist, but 
"the implementation of human rights under international law is 
primarily a domestic matter. "49 
Although the CCPR was opened for signature in 1966, the 
United States was slow to ratify it. President Jimmy Carter origi-
nally sent the CCPR to the Senate for its advice and consent in 
1978.so After the end of the Cold War, President George Bush 
renewed the request for Senate action, urging that ratification 
would "strengthen our ability to influence the development of 
appropriate human rights principles in the international commu-
nity and provide an additional and effective tool in our efforts to 
improve respect for fundamental freedoms in many problem 
countries around the world. "sl The Senate gave its consent on 
April 2, 1992,s2 and the CCPR has been in force for the United 
States since September 8, 1992.53 
In acceding to the CCPR, the United States placed certain 
limits on its promises, by adopting a brief series of reservations, 
understandings and declarations.s4 Most of the reservations ad-
46. See Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Com-
mentary 36-37, 55-56 (N.P. Engel, 1993); Oscar Schachter, The Obligation to Implement 
the Covenant in Domestic Law, in Henkin, ed., The International Bill of Rights: The Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights at 311, 319-20 (cited in note 44). 
47. See Thomas Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Per-
missible Derogations, in Henkin, ed., The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights at 77-78 (cited in note 44); Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 38, 313, 315 (cited in note 46). 
48. CCPR Article 2(3); see Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
CCPR Commentary at 58-60 (cited in note 46); Schachter, The Obligation to Implement 
the Covenant in Domestic Law, in Henkin, ed., The International Bill of Rights: The Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights at 311, 325, 329 (cited in note 44). 
49. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 27 
(cited in note 46). 
50. See Sen. Exec. Rep. 102-23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992) ("Sen. Exec. Rep."). 
51. Id. at 25. 
52. See 138 Cong. Rec. S4781-84 (1992). 
53. Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 889 
(cited in note 46). 
54. See 138 Cong. Rec. at S4783-84; David P. Stewart, U.S. Ratification of the Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the Reservations, Understandings 
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dressed treaty constraints that were stricter than U.S. constitu-
tional constraints. For example, a reservation to CCPR Article 6 
(right to life) preserves the United States' discretion to impose 
capital punishment on anyone, other than a pregnant woman, for 
a crime committed at any age, whenever its own Constitution 
permits.ss Conversely, broad American views on freedom of 
speech necessitated a reservation to CCPR Article 20, which 
would otherwise have required more sweeping prohibitions 
against propaganda for war and against advocacy of national, ra-
cial, or religious hatred than the First Amendment would per-
mit.s6 Moreover, one of the declarations attached by the Senate 
designates the CCPR as non-self-executing, i.e., not directly en-
forceable in the courts.s7 Finally, the Senate added an under-
standing relating to federalism, to which we will return in Part 
III. 
None of the American reservations, however, addresses 
CCPR Article 18, concerning freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion, and belief. That Article expresses a broader conception 
of religious liberty than the Smith interpretation of free exer-
cise.ss It guarantees to every person not only an absolute right 
"to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice," but also a 
and Declarations, 14 Human Rights L.J. 77 (1993). Doubts have been expressed about 
the validity of some of these reservations, understandings and declarations, or about their 
binding character, see, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341, 343 & n.ll, 346-47 (1995); Ved 
P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for Juvenile 
Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
42 DePaul L. Rev. 1311, 1331-32 (1993). These issues do not affect the present essay, 
because there is no reservation to Article 18. 
55. See Reservation No.2, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (1992). Moreover, a reservation to 
CCPR Article 7 (right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment) serves to trim '"cruel, inhuman or degrading"' back to U.S. 
constitutional standards under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments; this reser-
vation was prompted by European human rights case law critical of death row conditions 
in the U.S. See Reservation No. 3, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (1992); Stewart, 14 Human 
Rights L.J. at 81 (cited in note 54). 
56. See Reservation No. 1, 138 Cong. Rec. S4783 (1992). 
57. See Declaration No. 1, 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 (1992). The effect of such declara-
tions has been disputed. See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States 
Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 515, 527 (1991); Henkin, 89 Am. 1. lnt'l L. at 346-47 (cited in note 54). But that 
dispute need not concern us here. 
58. The acceptance of the obligation to respect the manifestation of religious beliefs 
illustrates an important point about the significance of the CCPR in the United States. 
Human rights experts critical of the United States' reservations to the CCPR have de-
scribed them as designed to ensure that the U.S. was taking on no new obligations, be-
yond what its constitution and laws already required. See, e.g., Henkin, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 
at 344 (cited in note 54). This rhetoric should not be misunderstood. The U.S. certainly 
identified a series of respects in which the CCPR would have imposed new obligations, 
and sought to avoid them. But the reservations contain no systematic exclusion of new 
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more qualified right "to manifest his religion or belief in worship, 
observance, practice and teaching. "s9 Limitation of the right to 
manifest one's religion or beliefs is permitted only where "neces-
sary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fun-
damental rights and freedoms of others."60 
The reference to freedom to "manifest" one's religion was 
not an innovation of the CCPR, but rather adopted language of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.6t In both cases, the 
language has been understood as extending beyond verbal ex-
pression of beliefs to include certain actions required by religious 
convictions.62 The Human Rights Committee, the principal in-
ternational body that oversees implementation of the CCPR,63 
has explained: 
The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, obser-
vance, practice and teaching encompasses a broad range of 
acts .... The observance and practice of religion or belief may 
include not only ceremonial acts but also such customs as the 
observance of dietary regulations, the wearing of distinctive 
clothing or headcoverings, participation in rituals associated 
obligations, and the U.S. did not explicitly reserve against every aspect of the CCPR that 
went beyond existing law. 
59. 1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief 
of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community with others and 
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance. 
practice and teaching. 
CCPR Art. 18(1). The absolute character of the former right is expressed in Art. 
18(2): 
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have 
or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice. 
60. CCPR Art. 18(3). In full: 
3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, 
order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. 
(For completeness, Art. 18(4) provides: 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the 
liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to ensure the religious 
and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.) 
61. UDHR art. 18 ("to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship 
and observance"). 
62. See Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 
320-22 (cited in note 46); Martin Scheinin, Article IB, in Asbj0m Eide, et a!., eds., The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary 263, 263-64, 267 (1992). 
63. See A.H. Robertson, The Implementation System: International Measures, in 
Henkin, ed., The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
332, 337 (cited in note 44). The Human Rights Committee's General Comments and 
decisions in individual cases have become a major source for interpretation of the CCPR. 
See generally Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Devel-
opment of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Ri~hts _(1991); Nowak, U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (ctted m note 46). 
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with certain stages of life, and the use of a particular language 
customarily spoken by a group.64 
45 
Furthermore, "[t]he Covenant does not explicitly refer to a right 
of conscientious objection [to military service], but the Commit-
tee believes that such a right can be derived from article 18, inas-
much as the obligation to use lethal force may seriously conflict 
with the freedom of conscience and the right to manifest one's 
religion or belief. "6s 
To be sure, the right to manifest one's religious beliefs is not 
absolute, and the criteria for justification of limitations on the 
right are not identical to the compelling interest test of United 
States constitutional law. Article 18(3) lists specific interests that 
might justify the limitation of the right, and because rights under 
Article 18(3) are nonderogable, this list cannot be supplemented 
by assertion of emergency powers.66 The listed interests-public 
safety, order, health, and morals and the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of others-is probably broad enough to include any in-
terest that would be recognized as compelling in U.S. law, as well 
as some non-compelling interests.67 The standard "necessary to 
protect [those interests]," as generally interpreted in the CCPR 
and comparable human rights treaties, incorporates a principle of 
proportionality. "Limitations may be applied only for those pur-
poses for which they were prescribed and must be directly re-
lated and proportionate to the specific need on which they are 
predicated."68 The requirement of proportionality may entail 
64. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, 'I 4 (1993). 
65. ld. 'I 11. This comment represents a shift from a view earlier expressed by the 
Committee, that the phrasing of CCPR Article 8(3)(c)(ii), providing that alternative ser-
vice "in countries where conscientious objection is recognized" does not amount to pro-
hibited forced labor, implied that the Covenant did not entail a right of conscientious 
objection to military service. See L. T.K. v. Finland (No. 185/1984) (1985), reprinted in 2 
Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee Under the Optional Protocol 61 
(1990). 
66. See CCPR Article 4(2) (listing nonderogable rights). The CCPR permits states, 
"[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation," to derogate from 
certain rights, i.e., to impose greater restrictions on their exercise than the CCPR would 
otherwise allow, "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation." I d. 
Art. 4(1). 
67. The Human Rights Committee has noted, however, that limitations for the pro-
tection of morals "must be based on principles not deriving exclusively from a single 
[social, philosophical or religious] tradition." General Comment No. 22, 'I 8. 
68. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, 'I 8; see also Nowak, U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 325 (cited in note 46) 
("The requirement of necessity implies that the restriction must be proportional in sever-
ity and intensity to the purpose being sought and may not become the rule.") (emphasis 
deleted); Torkel Opsahl, Articles 29 and 30, in Eide, UDHR Commentary at 449, 462 
(cited in note 62) ("the necessity of applying a limitation depends on whether there is a 
reasonable proportion between the purpose to be achieved and the measures adopted"). 
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that only compelling interests would justify severe interferences 
with the right to manifest beliefs in practice, while imposing a 
more relaxed burden of justification on less severe interferences. 
Thus, once the United States ratified the CCPR, it acquired 
a treaty obligation to ensure that the freedom to manifest reli-
gious beliefs in action would not be infringed without propor-
tionate justification. Whether that treaty obligation was validly 
acquired depends on whether it conflicts in some way with the 
Constitution. The mere fact that the treaty may require the ex-
tension of religious exemptions within areas of traditional state 
regulation creates no obstacle to its validity. The reach of the 
separately enumerated treaty power to matters ordinarily of local 
concern, free from any "invisible radiation from the general 
terms of the Tenth Amendment," was settled in Missouri v. 
Holland.69 
Even if the grant of the treaty power includes some inherent 
limit requiring treaties to address matters of legitimate interna-
tional concern,1o there can be no doubt today that human rights 
are among those matters. How a country treats its own nationals 
is no longer a matter of exclusive domestic concern, but rather a 
subject of international cooperation and oversight.71 The United 
Nations Charter commits the U.N. to promote observance of 
human rights and commits its members to take joint and separate 
action in cooperation with the U.N. to achieve that purpose.n 
The proposition that promotion and protection of human rights 
is a legitimate concern of the international community recently 
received strong reaffirmation in the Vienna Declaration and Pro-
gramme of Action of 1993, and in the resulting establishment of a 
U.N. High Commissioner for human rights.73 The United States 
has not only made human rights conditions in other countries a 
major focus of its foreign policy, but has even explained military 
Readers may need to be warned that international tribunals overseeing compliance 
with human rights treaties often defer to national courts by according them a "margin of 
appreciation" in assessing local conditions that would justify limitati_on ?fa ~ght. Th_us 
international tribunals deliberately "underenforce" the standard of JUstificattOn, and tts 
stringency is not directly evidenced by their conclusions in particular cases. 
69. 252 U.S. 416,434 (1920); see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States § 302, comment d (1987). 
70. But see Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
§ 302, comment c (1987) (denying the existence of such a limitation on the treaty power). 
71. Id. at 144-45. 
72. U.N. Charter, Arts. 55, 56. 
73. See United Nations World Conference on Human Rights: Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action,§ I, '1'1. 4, 6, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661, 1665-66 (1993); United 
Nations: General Assembly Resolution on the High Commissioner for the Promotion and 
Protection of All Human Rights, 'I 3, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 303, 305 (1994). 
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interventions in other countries by the need to protect the human 
rights of their own nationals.74 Reciprocal guarantees of human 
rights subject the United States to international scrutiny of its 
human rights record while facilitating American and interna-
tional scrutiny of other countries' records. In urging the Senate 
to give its consent to the CCPR, the Bush administration empha-
sized that "U.S. ratification would also strengthen our ability to 
influence the development of appropriate human rights princi-
ples in the international community and provide an additional 
and effective tool in our efforts to improve respect for fundamen-
tal freedoms in many problem countries around the world. "7s In-
deed, only by ratifying the CCPR did the United States gain the 
opportunity for one of its own nationals, Professor Thomas Bu-
ergenthal, to become a member of the Human Rights Committee 
and participate in its elaboration and oversight of the CCPR.76 
To reject the validity of the CCPR as a binding United 
States treaty and a source of congressional power, one would 
have to repudiate Missouri v. Hollandn and enshrine the pro-
gram of the failed Bricker amendment of the 1950s, which was 
designed to insulate "states' rights" from international human 
rights treaties, particularly in the fields of racial discrimination 
and social legislation.7s The Supreme Court's reinvigoration of 
the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause in Lopez is unlikely 
to foreshadow so radical a change. The statute invalidated in Lo-
pez needlessly doubled legislation that the individual states could 
enact for themselves (and largely had).79 Individual states can-
not, however, enter into reciprocal agreements with foreign na-
74. See Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 96, 125 (1995) (under heading War Powers-Deploy-
ment of U.S. Military Forces into Haiti); W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of 
International Action, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 82 (1995); Jane E. Stromseth, Iraq's Repression of 
Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges, in Lori Fisler 
Damrosch, ed., Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts 77, 89-90, 
94-95 (1993) (describing U.S. participation in measures to protect Kurds and Shi'ites in 
Iraq). 
75. Sen. Exec. Rep. at 25. 
76. CCPR art. 28(2) (requiring Committee members to be nationals of States-Par-
ties to the CCPR). 
77. 252 u.s. 416 (1920). 
78. See Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker Amendment Controversy: A Test of Eisen-
hower's Political Leadership (1988); Henkin, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. at 348-49 (cited in note 54). 
One prominent feature of most versions of the Bricker amendment was ''the which 
clause," providing that "A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United 
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty." S.J. Res. 43, 
reprinted in Tananbaum at 223-24 (emphasis added). 
79. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624, 1626 (noting charges against Lo-
pez under both Texas and federal law); id. at 1641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("(T]he re-
served powers of the States are sufficient to enact those measures. Indeed, over 40 States 
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tions guaranteeing that both will maintain certain laws. The 
Constitution expressly denies to the states the power to make 
"Treat[ies]," and permits them to enter into a lesser category of 
international "Agreement[s]" only with the consent of Con-
gress.so Requiring the unanimous agreement of Congress and all 
the states for ratification of any treaty that includes a provision 
addressing "local" concerns would greatly hamper American 
participation in international treaty regimes. The present Court 
shows no evidence of any intent to hamstring the international 
relations of the United States in this manner. 
At the same time, a treaty must not violate the constitu-
tional rights of individuals.st Specifically, a question of the Es-
tablishment Clause limitations on the grant of religious 
exemptions may arise with respect to Article 18, parallel to the 
question that arises with respect to RFRA.s2 But Article 18(3) 
includes an escape clause parallel to that of RFRA: if a particu-
lar requested exemption were so extreme as to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause, then its denial would probably be necessary to 
protect the "fundamental rights and freedoms of others."s3 In-
deed, the rule of proportionality may strike a more equal balance 
between the rights of conscience and the rights of others than 
does RFRA's compelling interest standard. Moreover, Article 
18 is less vulnerable to the charge of unduly favoring religion 
than RFRA may be, because Article 18 does not confine its pro-
tection to the religious. The freedom to manifest religion or be-
lief also applies to nonreligious convictions-although 
presumably these are manifested less in worship and observance 
than in practice and teaching.B4 
The question might remain whether some conception of sep-
aration of powers or the primacy of judicial interpretation of con-
stitutional rights prevents the federal government from acceding 
already have criminal laws outlawing the possession of firearms on or near school 
grounds."). 
80. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, cis. 1, 3; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the 
Constitution 229-33 (Foundation Press, Inc., 1972). 
81. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States§ 302, comment b (1987). 
82. See note 17 and accompanying text. 
83. See Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 
329 (cited in note 46) ("the term 'fundamental rights' points primarily toward national 
law and describes in general those subjective rights that, in comparison to other rights, are 
more strongly protected (usually at the level of the constitution) with special national 
remedies"). 
84. General Comment No. 22, en: 2, 5 ("Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and 
atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief'); Nowak, U.N. 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary at 316 (cited in note 46). 
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to an international human rights treaty that employs a broader 
conception of religious liberty than that contained in the First 
Amendment. The answer is surely no. The Smith decision does 
not stand for the proposition that the only defensible conception 
of religious liberty is one that subjects conscientious objectors to 
all generally applicable criminal laws. Justice Scalia's opinion for 
the Court is a typically positivist performance. It invokes the 
words of the First Amendment "[a]s a textual matter,"ss the 
Court's own precedents (albeit creatively),s6 and "constitutional 
tradition and common sense."s7 It relies on pragmatic institu-
tional objections to enforcement of the compelling interest test 
by the judiciary,ss and invites the affirmative accommodation of 
religious belief by the legislature: "[T]o say that a nondiscrimina-
tory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is 
desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and 
that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned 
by the courts. "s9 So long as the adoption of a more expansive 
vision of religious liberty does not violate some other constitu-
tional value (like non-establishment), it does not exceed the 
treaty power. Nor is adherence to an international human rights 
treaty subject to the reproach that it undermines the integrity of 
the courts by commanding them to "participate in a constitu-
tional charade. "90 
By 1993, then, the United States had an international obliga-
tion to ensure a right of religious practice, subject to permissible 
limitations. Legislative reaction to the Smith decision's with-
drawal of judicial protection was not only appropriate, but 
necessary. 
III. CONGRESSIONAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
CCPR 
The Necessary and Proper Clause empowers Congress to en-
act legislation implementing a valid international treaty, just as it 
may implement other federal powers.9t Accordingly, Congress 
85. 494 U.S. at 878. 
86. Id. at 878-84. 
87. ld. at 885. 
88. Id. at 887, 890. 
89. ld. at 890. 
90. Eisgruber and Sager, 69 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 470 (cited in note 16). 
91. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920); Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 
121-22 (1901). For an apt post-Lopez exposition, see United States v. Yian, 905 F. Supp. 
160, 163-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (upholding broad definition in Hostage Taking Act as reason-
ably related to implementation of International Convention Against the Taking of 
Hostages). 
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has the power to enact domestic legislation implementing Article 
18 of the CCPR as a valid treaty obligation of the United States. 
Indeed, Congress could have justified RFRA itself as a 
means of effectuating Article 18. In some respects, RFRA prob-
ably affords individuals greater protection than Article 18 would 
strictly require, while in other respects it affords less protection. 
The compelling interest test of RFRA appears to be more de-
manding than the standard for "necessary" limitations under Ar-
ticle 18. RFRA's category of substantial burdens on the exercise 
of religion might be broader than the category of limitations on 
the right to manifest one's religion in worship, observance, prac-
tice, and teaching.9z Nonetheless, just as Congress found in 
RFRA that the compelling interest test was a traditional and 
workable standard for resolving conflicts between the exercise of 
religion and other government interests, so Congress could rea-
sonably find that the traditional categories of religious exercise 
and compelling interest provided an appropriate mechanism for 
protecting the manifestation of religious beliefs in practice within 
the legal system of the United States. 
Meanwhile, RFRA's focus on the exercise of religion is nar-
rower than Article 18's attention to the manifestation of both 
religious and nonreligious beliefs. And RFRA employs tradi-
tional domestic state action concepts, regulating direct interfer-
ence with religion by governments, and not interference with 
religion by private actors. RFRA therefore provides only a par-
tial implementation of Article 18. The United States Constitu-
tion, however, gives Congress the authority to enact legislation 
enforcing those aspects of a treaty for which Congress deems leg-
islation necessary, while leaving other aspects of the treaty for 
implementation by other means. So long as RFRA's selectivity 
does not violate other constitutional norms, like equal protection 
or non-establishment, its narrower scope creates no constitu-
tional objection.93 
92. The reach of both the statute and the treaty in relation to conduct motivated, but 
not dictated, by religious beliefs is unsettled. Compare Laycock and Thomas, 73 Tex. L. 
Rev. at 231-34 (cited in note 13) with Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
CCPR Commentary at 321 (cited in note 46) (speculating on limits of the concept of 
.. practice"). 
93. To say that Congress may constitutionally proceed one step at a time is not to 
say that the United States has no present international duty to comply fully with the 
obligations it has undertaken. The CCPR requires compliance, not progressive imple-
mentation over a lengthy period, unlike the companion International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights. See Nowak, U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: CCPR Commentary at 56-57 (cited in note 46); Schachter, The Obligation to Im-
plement the Covenant in Domestic Law, in Henkin, ed., The International Bill of Rights: 
The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at 323-24 (cited in note 44). 
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Thus, we see that Congress could have justified RFRA as an 
implementation of Article 18, but evidently did not rely on this 
basis at the time of enactment. How should this affect a court 
reviewing the constitutionality of the statute? On the one hand, 
Congress expressly found that new legislation was needed in or-
der to effectuate the freedom to act in accordance with the dic-
tates of conscience, and the statute and its legislative history 
leave no doubt that Congress intended to intrude on state regula-
tory authority to whatever extent the standards legislated in 
RFRA required. If, as Justice Brennan stated in EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, it suffices that a court "be able to discern some legislative 
purpose or factual predicate that supports the exercise of [a 
given] power," and "'[t]he ... constitutionality of action taken by 
Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it un-
dertakes to exercise, "'94 then the presumption of constitutional-
ity may oblige the courts to uphold a statute under any 
congressional power that objectively supports it.9s On the other 
hand, the current Supreme Court majority is more protective of 
state power and more willing to make exercises of federal au-
thority depend on clarity of statement or explicitness of find-
ings.% In the case of RFRA, where Congress expressly identified 
a different source for its authority, there may be an important 
process value in refusing to defer to implicit conclusions that 
Congress demonstrably never drew. 
There is further reason for courts to be hesitant to interpret 
the current RFRA as an implementation of Article 18. The Sen-
ate has expressed its political reluctance to use the CCPR to dis-
place state lawmaking, in the "understanding" on federalism 
included within the package of reservations, understandings, and 
declarations at ratification. That understanding provides: 
That the United States understands that this Covenant shall be 
implemented by the Federal Government to the extent that it 
94. 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1983) (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 
U.S. 138, 144 (1948)). It should be admitted, however, that the immediately succeeding 
sentence in Cloyd Miller begins: "Here it is plain from the legislative history that Con-
gress was invoking its war power .... " 
95. See also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1656 (1995) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 1658-59 (Breyer J., dissenting); Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir. 
19%) (Posner, C.J.) ("[I]t is not the motive of the legislators that is important ... but 
whether (RFRA] is within the scope of their constitutional authority."), petition for cert. 
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3370 (Oct. 29, 19%) (No. 96-710). 
96. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631-32 (1995); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452, 468-70 (1991); PhilipP. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Find-
ings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 
695 (1996). 
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exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matters 
covered therein, and otherwise by the state and local govern-
ments; to the extent that state and local governments exercise 
jurisdiction over such matters, the Federal Government shall 
take measures appropriate to the Federal system to the end 
that the competent authorities of the state or local govern-
ments may take appropriate measures for the fulfillment of 
the Covenant.97 
The legislative history explains that an understanding rather than 
a reservation was employed, because "the intent is not to modify 
or limit U.S. undertakings under the Covenant but rather to put 
our future treaty partners on notice with regard to the implica-
tions of our federal system concerning implementation."9s 
It has been observed that this understanding "serve[s] no 
legal purpose."99 Adding such a declaration of intent does not 
decrease the United States' international obligations and does 
not decrease in the slightest the power of Congress to implement 
those obligations. The content of the understanding is wholly cir-
cular-"measures appropriate to the Federal system" include, 
when Congress deems it necessary, federal legislation ensuring 
that state and local governments comply with the international 
obligations of the United States. Indeed, if one takes seriously 
Justice O'Connor's insistence in New York v. United Stateswo that 
state autonomy and political accountability preclude the federal 
government from "commandeering" state legislatures and ad-
ministrators to carry out federal programs, then implementing 
the CCPR through direct federal legislation is more "appropriate 
to the Federal system" than leaving implementation to the states. 
(Actually, this observation may illustrate the inapplicability of 
New York v. United States to exercises of the treaty power,1o1 and 
the weakness of the evidence for the anti-commandeering princi-
ple in general.) 
The federalism understanding does, however, signal the 
political reality that some members of Congress are reluctant to 
97. Understanding No. 5, 138 Cong. Rec. S4784 (1992). It may bear mention that 
the consent to ratification of the CCPR was a product of the 102d Congress, and RFRA 
was a product of the 103d. 
98. Sen. Exec. Rep. at 18 (cited in note 50) (reprinting Bush Administration's 
explanation). 
99. Henkin, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. at 346 (cited in note 54). 
100. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992). 
101. Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method In Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 1221, 1260 (1995) 
(describing the anti-commandeering principle, without citation, as "a limit not applicable, 
of course, to the treaty power"). 
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exercise existing federal power to enforce the CCPR in areas of 
traditional state regulation. This reality, as well as inattention, 
may explain why Congress did not refer to the CCPR as one of 
its bases for enacting RFRA. 
Ultimately, then, CCPR Article 18 probably does not pro-
vide a proper basis for upholding RFRA as enacted in 1993, 
although it would support a verbatim reenactment of the statute 
if Congress so chose. Nonetheless, Article 18 is important to the 
debate over RFRA in two major respects. First, understanding 
international human rights law as an alternative source for con-
gressional adoption of a statutory model of religious liberty that 
diverges from Supreme Court doctrine may expose some of the 
flaws in the argument that RFRA places Congress in opposition 
to the judiciary. It illustrates how a remedial statute can invoke 
constitutional values and standards for legitimate instrumental 
reasons, and need not be seen as an effort to redefine them. It 
makes clearer the duty of the courts to interpret and enforce the 
law, and to ensure that they do not confuse similarly phrased 
statutory and constitutional norms. Judges as pragmatic crafters 
of doctrine may overrule earlier formulations that they find "un-
workable," but only in the most extreme cases do they have the 
authority to reject a legislatively mandated standard on such 
grounds. 
Second, Article 18 offers a variant model of religious exemp-
tion that may be normatively more attractive than the compelling 
interest model that RFRA appears to embody. Article 18 recog-
nizes the demands of both religious and secular conscience, 
within their differing ranges of conduct. Its standard of propor-
tionality is more flexible and requires more in the way of mutual 
accommodation than the literal application of a compelling inter-
est test. Although Congress's authority to implement Article 18 
includes the power to enact more rigid commands, Article 18 
would also permit a more moderate regime of accommodation 
that would respond to Smith without excessive sacrifice of other 
values. 
If RFRA should someday be invalidated due to lack of con-
gressional authority, it will be because Congress did not pay heed 
to the CCPR, not because Congress could not have found the 
authority. Renewed attention to the protection of religious lib-
erty in global perspective could then lead to a firmer foundation 
for federal action, and perhaps to a better-designed statute. 
Overcoming the reluctance to rely on the CCPR would also em-
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bed the RFRA policy in a context that expresses a broader com-
mitment to human liberty. 
